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1 INTRODUCTION 
Motto: Battles can be divided into three categories: 
- Those that are implemented according to a plan 
- Those that are based on improvisation 
- Those that just happen. 
A worldwide change is underway in the development of the 
armed forces of the major powers, the general trend being 
towards smaller, but more professional forces with sophisticated 
force projection capability. They will have better firepower, 
mobility and protection, and will be better equipped to operate 
under special circumstances. The role of special forces is 
increasing. 
The great powers are focusing on the development of an 
information warfare capability,' in order to be able to master 
both their own and opponents' information systems. Once this 
has been achieved, it will revolutionise organization structures, 
tactics and the operational arts, making it possible to maintain an 
overwhelming operational tempo. Although information warfare 
methods have already been used in various operations and 
incidents, the development of such techniques is still at an early 
stage. Theoretical ideas are still being shaped to practical functions 
and systems. 
The ever more technical armed forces all over the world are 
becoming increasingly costly to maintain, and at the same time 
the end of the east-west juxtaposition and the deepening of 
European security architectures have shed a new light on the 
development of armed forces. Multi-nationality and 
interoperability are the current guidelines for the development 
of western armed forces, a process that is clearly being led by the 
United States, which commits approximately three times more 
resources to research and development than all the other NATO 
countries combined. 
Major Pekka Toveri is Chief of the Armour School and major Heikki Väli-
vehmas is Deputy Defence Attache in Washington D.C. They graduated from 
the General Staff Course of the Finnish National Defence College in 1995. 
The character of modern warfare has changed in the light of 
these facts, as pointed out by the latest crises in southeastern 
Europe and the Middle East. Instead of long traditional 
campaigns, the great powers are trying to secure their vital 
national interests by implementing rapid strategic strikes with 
"surgical precision" against selected targets anywhere in the 
world. The capacity of these precision-weapon systems makes it 
possible to destroy almost any target they chose. These strikes 
are made possible by the use of overwhelming intelligence, 
surveillance and command systems, which operate out of the 
reach of the worldwide media, although the results of such 
attacks may be presented with near real-time promptitude by the 
television and other media. The users of these ultra-modern 
weapons systems are professionals who are thoroughly trained 
in their operation and deployment. 
These new methods are illustrated well by the Iraq crisis 
of December 1998, for example, or the Kosovo crisis of 1999. 
In the Iraq crisis the US and British forces that were 
concentrated in the vicinity of Iraq were used after brief 
preparations to hit limited but carefully chosen targets in a 
very short operation. In the Kosovo crisis the preparation 
and execution phase was much longer, due to the strategic 
aims of the operation. In both conflicts the adversary's 
conscript army, possessing traditional weapons systems, 
was at a clear disadvantage. It is significant that the strikes 
were not limited to military targets, but especially in the 
Kosovo operation the targets were often object vital to the 
functioning of civilian society. 
Similar questions must be raised as we develop Finland's 
defence system, since modern warfare places new demands in 
this respect. While the national defence will remain the main task 
of the armed forces in the future, response to international crises 
will bring the armed forces new tasks and responsibilities. These 
dual requirements for the future require flexible and 
continuously developing tactics and organizations which allow 
for changing circumstances and technical development. The key 
question is how can we develop an adequately efficient and 
capable defence with our limited resources. 2 
In a report presented to Parliament on 17th March 1997 
entitled " The European Security Development and Finnish 
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Defence", the Finnish Council of State laid down guidelines 
for the development of the defence forces in the near future. 
The major guideline was a new threat model, the "Strategic 
Surprise Strike", in the face of which the report recommends 
the development of new readiness units and adequate 
helicopter capacity to support them. Some of the 
procurement projects recommended in the report have 
already begun. 
Due to the geo-strategic position of Finland, the old threat 
models will also persist, including the danger of a large-scale 
strategic offensive aimed at seizing the country or parts of it. The 
requirement to prepare in the long term for threats of different 
kinds places heavy demands on the development of the armed 
forces. At the same time, active participation in international 
crisis management operations calls for considerable resources, 
due to the rotation of units and the high usage of material and 
equipment. Is the path we have now chosen the right one, and 
can it guarantee the development of versatile and flexible 
defence forces? 
The priorities for the development of Finland's defence 
forces are the national defence and participation in 
international crisis management. This should affect both the 
decisions we make, and all of our development efforts. 
There are numerous factors in our systems and 
infrastructure, which form a foundation for the development of 
our defence policy. These structures and functions have a long 
and varied history behind them and they are nowadays able to 
serve as a basis both for changing the structures and for 
preserving them. 
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2 AIM AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
RESEARCH 
This study aims to consider the viability of the development of 
tactical-operational level functions in the information age 
battlefield. Potential changes in force structures, organizations, 
command hierarchies, command and control systems and 
training systems cannot be ignored. 
The study is adapted to a framework of factors which affect 
warfare at the tactical-operational level (see Figure 1). The 
questions to be answered are: 
- 	How will future warfare and battlefields develop in our 
circumstances? 
- 	What models for the use of force are suitable as a basis for 
developing operational-tactical level forces? and 
- 	What functional and structural methods at the operational- 
tactical level can be used to develop the capacities and 
command and control systems of our forces, in view of the 
demands and capabilities mentioned below. 
Geo-strategic position 
Resources available 	 Technical development, 
progress in armed forces 
Challenges and opportunities for 
the defence of Finland F-I 
Participating into international 	Tasks related to national defence crisis management 
Figure 1. The framework of factors affecting future warfare. 
This work is based on the assumptions that general 
conscription and the concept of total defence constitute a 
foundation that will raise the threshold for a foreign offensive, 
and that this foundation will be maintained in the future. 
Finland's defence forces are prepared to fight on our own soil to 
safeguard national sovereignty. 
The tasks of the defence forces remain as they were specified 
in the 1974 Defence Forces: 
• To handle surveillance of the country's land and sea areas 
and airspace in co-operation with other supervisory 
authorities; 
• To secure the territorial integrity of the country, using force 
if necessary; 
• To defend the country and its juridical system, and the 
livelihood and basic rights of the population; 
• To ensure the maintenance and development of the 
country's military defence readiness; 
• To provide military training, support voluntary defence 
training and contribute to promoting the will of citizens to 
defend the country, while also encouraging activities to 
improve their physical condition; 
• To provide executive assistance in the maintenance of law 
and order as prescribed by the law and to take part in rescue 
operations; 
• To participate in peace-keeping training and to maintain 
readiness and various arrangements for peacekeeping 
activities, as ordered by the Ministry of Defence and 
• To carry out other functions as prescribed by law.3 
Participation in peacekeeping operations is regulated by a 
specific Peacekeeping Act, the latest amendment to which is 
dated December 1995. This allows Finland to participate in 
peacekeeping under a UN or OSCE mandate aimed at 
maintaining international peace and security or providing 
humanitarian relief and protecting a civilian population. This 
way the Act makes it possible to participate in extended 
peacekeeping, but not in peace enforcement., The Act may be 
reviewed in the near future, however, and it is possible that 
Finnish forces could be used in more demanding crisis 
management operations.4 
i 
The whole of society and all the authorities are prepared 
to participate in the defence of the nation according to their 
appointed tasks. We shall concentrate here, however, on military 
command and control, planning and operations., particularly 
with respect to the operational-tactical level after the start of 
hostilities. In the Finnish situation, this means in effect the 
Command level and below. Although information warfare 
operations against the civilian society and its systems are a grave 
threat that also affects military operations, these will not be 
covered by the present work. 
The resources allocated for the national defence are not 
assumed to increase significantly in the future, but this defence 
will continue to be based on high public willingness to defend 
the country and a high level of national expertise. Some of the 
Finnish forces will have to prepare for participation in possible 
international crisis management operations beyond Finland's 
borders as such requirements are increasingly becoming a part 
of European-centred crisis- management co-operation and 
Finland has already committed forces to such operations if 
needed. 
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3 FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATIONS 
3.1 Technical development and its influence on the capacities of 
weapon systems 
Technical development of combat infrastructures has been 
increasing constantly during recent decades. Information 
technologies are developing at a speed that has never been 
experienced before, and are expected to develop a thousand- fold 
during the next few decades5 . Progress has in fact been so rapid, 
that it has started to influence the development of tactics and 
operational skills6 . The potential provided by these technologies 
and the ongoing development of new ones will influence how 
the armed forces are organised, commanded and used. 
The most important areas of development for the great 
powers involve information technologies. Highly developed 
command and management systems already make it possible to 
collect, analyse, edit and disseminate enormous amounts of 
information, so huge that man himself is becoming the weakest 
link in the information processing chain? . In order to speed up 
the command cycle, there are automatic command support 
systems under development that will be able to process and 
analyse information. 
Civilian information systems are increasing in capacity even 
faster than military ones, and are also being used in military 
operations8 , partly in order to reduce costs. Older systems will 
still be used alongside the latest technology for long time, 
however, in both civilian society and in the armed forces of the 
major powers. 
The information collection capacity of intelligence systems 
is increasing constantly. The main emphasis is now on electronic 
intelligence, where systems based on multi-sensor technology 
make operational security very difficult. These have increased 
the precision of intelligence to the point where, instead of mere 
observation of a target area, it is possible to recognise individual 
targets very accurately. The linking of highly developed 
guidance systems to intelligence systems makes it possible to 
start engagement with the target almost immediately.' 
Intelligence sensors are more and more frequently airborne, 
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in order to supervise larger areas. The use of UAVs in 
particular will increase, facilitating surveillance of target 
areas continuously in real-time for long periods. Russian 
estimates are that 80% of the intelligence information needed 
for the preparation and implementation of operations will in 
future be collected by air." 
By combining intelligence information with information on 
one's own troops and their location, it is possible to create for the 
operational commander, an almost real-time, accurate situational 
awareness covering both his own and the enemy-controlled 
areasll . Command and control systems make it possible to 
forward analysed intelligence, surveillance and target 
information both hierarchically and non-hierarchically to 
multiple levels simultaneously. 
This results in a solid, reliable picture of the combat zone. 
Operational commanders at all levels see the enemy, their own 
troops, third parties and supporting troops, and autonomous 
elements are capable of more independent action because they 
have better situational awareness and they share a common view 
of the requirements of the battlefield with others. Tests have 
shown that simultaneous distribution of information to the 
different headquarters sections and subordinate levels shortens 
reaction times with respect to battle field events12 .'" 
The main emphasis in the development of weapon systems 
is increasingly being placed on the development of electronic 
warfare and precision weapon systems. The importance of 
electronic warfare and control of the electromagnetic battle space 
are ever more important for ensuring one's own information 
superiority.14 
Precision weapon systems are increasing in range, precision 
and effectiveness at the same time as they are becoming 
cheaperl5 .Less firing units and fewer projectiles will be needed 
to accomplish the same effect in the future16 . Precision weapons 
can be placed on almost any platform, so that they can be 
launched by infantrymen or from armoured vehicles or 
warships. The main emphasis in the future will be on airborne 
platforms, however, because these provide a better range and 
rapid changes of centres of gravity. UAVs, for example, will be 
used more and more as weapon platforms17 . 
More important than the increase in the efficiency of 
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weapon systems is the integration of intelligence and 
surveillance systems and the use of firepower. The time from 
observation of a target to its possible destruction is decreasing 
significantly. US Army tests have shown that while no single 
system itself can significantly raise efficiency, the integration of 
systems and the synergy created by the simultaneous 
employment of all systems can improve it considerably.18 
Dependence on single target detection systems or on those 
attached to individual weapon systems is decreasing as sensors 
and weapon systems are being integrated. It is possible to 
forward information acquired by different sensor systems in 
real-time to firing units in an integrated weapon system 
network., so that target information acquired by a warship's 
radar, for example, can be forwarded to a land-based anti-aircraft 
battery, which will then engage the target.19 
Evaluation of firing results is essential for achieving the 
desired outcome. Earlier, this required an interruption in firing, 
reconnaissance of the target, analysis of the intelligence 
information and a new firing decision, but in the future this will 
be almost a real-time process and part of the continuous use of 
operative firepower over the whole combat zone. Almost real-
time assessment of the efficiency of firing will facilitate 
continuous destruction of the opponent's forces, and will thereby 
increase the tempo of the operation.2° 
The US Army has estimated that it will be theoretically 
possible by the 2010's to destroy a traditional division consisting 
of 800 combat vehicles and 2200 support vehicles in 10 minutes 
with the direct and indirect firing systems of a single brigade 
supported by corps-level weapons.21  
The efficiency, range, precision and engagement speed of 
traditional indirect and direct firing weapon systems will also 
increase. Intelligent, target-seeking ammunition will be used 
more frequently in artillery, mortars and rocket artillery, and the 
protection afforded by fortifications will decrease. 
In order to protect troops, it will become more important to 
hide them than to fortify their positions. Camouflage systems are 
nowadays lighter and can be used to protect vehicles, equipment 
and personnel against several intelligence sensors 
simultaneously. Stealth techniques are being used in the 
development of all the major weapons systems, such as the main 
battle tanks, combat vehicles and combat helicopters, making 
them even more difficult to detect. 
Night vision equipment such as image intensifiers and 
thermal sights is becoming lighter, cheaper and more effective, 
enabling their use at lower organization levels. Night operations 
are mounted especially against a technically inferior enemy, in 
order to multiply one's strengths. Radars are used in heavier 
weapon and intelligence systems, and the combining of different 
sensors enables operations to take place not only at night but also 
in bad weather. 
The value of less complex technical equipment is 
decreasing. Signal, sensor and night fighting systems are 
affordable for a larger user group, and commercial media and 
communication services are developing very quickly, so that 
they can also be used to support military operations. This also 
poses a threat to operational security, however.22 
The development of large integrated systems is still 
extremely expensive, and only the great powers can afford to 
develop their own systems to the desired extent. The 
technological superiority of the United States is increasing, 
especially in the area of information technology, where the gap 
will increase in the future due to the enormous research 
resources that the country possesses. The Western European 
countries will lag behind in this, and Russia is already dropping 
even farther behind. 
However, even the United States can "digitise" only some 
of its units and equip them with the latest technology, as 
developing forces capable of operating on the information age 
battlefield has proved to be more expensive and more difficult 
than was anticipated. The US Army has, for example, been forced 
to postpone equipping of her divisions. It will be possible to fully 
equip only one third of the US Army's six heavy divisions with 
the latest digital technology during the next ten years.23 
Dependence on information systems and continuous 
information flow can also become an "Achilles-heel" for large 
armies, as they may become very vulnerable to strikes against 
these systems and their ultimate disruption. The loss, 
manipulation or compromise of vital digital information may 
give their opponent a great advantage. The manipulation of GPS 
data, for example, may considerably reduce the accuracy of 
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firing and the reliability of the overall situational picture.24 
Dependence on command and control systems and the 
feeling of complete control over situations may also create a false 
sense of security. According to US Army training experiences, 
staffs supported by advanced C3 systems tend to neglect the 
planning process, especially the preparation of alternative plans. 
This has resulted in surprising setbacks during combat 
exercises.25 
The amount of data flowing into C4I systems is massive due 
to the capabilities of modern intelligence sensors. Added to all 
other information moving in the systems, this massive 
information flow could in the future potentially overwhelm the 
capacity of communication systems and intelligence analysers. 
A critical piece of information may not reach its planned 
destination because the communication networks are blocked by 
lower grade information. A good example of this problem is the 
bombing of the Chinese embassy during the "Allied Force" 
operation in Kosovo26 . The administration of information flow 
may prove in the future to be almost as important as the 
administration of logistic traffic is today.27 
The C41 systems now being developed, with automated 
intelligence analysis, cannot totally solve this problem, because 
human decisions must be part of the process, at least when 
deciding about the use of force. This places certain limits on the 
speed of even the most modern C4I systems, and makes it 
possible to affect the decision-making process through the 
human element.28 
Even the most advanced intelligence and command 
systems cannot guarantee perfect situational awareness and 
perfect control over the battle space. More important is the 
relative advantage gained over the opponent by better battle 
space control. Due to his relatively reduced situational 
awareness, the opponent's processes of making and executing 
decisions will be slower, which will lead to an ever more serious 
loss of battle space control.29 
The ability of the major powers to tolerate losses is 
diminishing as they are becoming increasingly dependent on 
their key systems. As centralised intelligence, command and 
weapon systems become fewer, it is also becoming increasingly 
difficult to replace losses to these systems. 
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3.2 Trends in the development of the armved forces of the major 
powers 
Developments in troops, tactics, operational skills and command 
in the western countries 
Changes in the structure of the armed forces of the major 
powers are affected by various economic, technical and political 
aspects. The budgets assigned to armed forces have in general 
decreased in the western world since the Cold War, and no 
significant increase is to be seen in the future30 . As the threat of 
a major war has declined in the Europe, large mobilisation 
armies based on universal conscription have become 
unnecessary in many western countries. 
On the other hand there is a need to be able to operate 
outside one's own area in order to facilitate joint defence and 
crisis management operations. All the leading Western European 
countries are members of NATO, and the EU has also begun to 
develop a common defence system of its own, beginning from 
the creation and development of a crisis management capability. 
The major powers also have a need to be able to operate outside 
their own area to protect vital national interests. 
In the light of these requirements, the western armed forces 
are reducing their manpower and developing smaller, 
professional forces. France and Spain, for example, have decided 
to change their conscript system for a professional system, and 
Italy is reducing the number of its conscripts. Great Britain and 
the United States have reduced their professional forces. 
Armed forces will be developed for other tasks as well as 
war in the future, e.g. humanitarian and peacekeeping 
operations., and this will require them to be trained to be 
doctrinally flexible, with strategic mobility, of tailor-made and 
modular composition, and capable of taking part in joint 
multinational operations and undertaking multiple tasks. 
Doctrinal flexibility is essential because operational conditions 
and opponents will be more and more difficult to predict in the 
future., but it can be achieved only if the leaders and troops are 
trained constantly to adapt their tactics, techniques, functions 
and organizations to changing situations.31  
Army units will have fewer personnel and equipment in 
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the future. As an example, the new US Army heavy division 
will have 15% fewer personnel and the number of main battle 
tanks and combat infantry vehicles will decrease by almost 
20%32 . The reduction will probably not stop here, and the 
personnel will decrease more in the long run. The US Army is 
also studying the possibility of abandoning its divisional 
organization structure in favour of brigades that are capable 
of operating independently. 
The increased capacity of weapons and intelligence systems 
means that smaller organizations can monitor and control larger 
areas. Although the organization of the US Army heavy division 
has been lightened, it is estimated that its operational area will 
be twice as large as before, about 24 000 square kilometres33 . 
According to some tests it has been estimated that by the 2010s a 
platoon may be able to perform the same tasks which today 
require an entire company34 . 
The organization at the platoon, company and battalion 
levels will probably not change significantly. The leader-to-lead 
ratio cannot be too high at these levels, otherwise the leaders will 
lose their ability for timely and effective decision-making. At 
higher-levels, however, new command and control systems will 
facilitate an increased span of control, especially in support 
elements.35 
Coincident with the decrease in numbers of troops, their 
mobility, protection and firepower will increase. The number of 
precision weapon systems and electronic intelligence and 
jamming systems will increase and these will be fielded at lower 
organization levels. 
As the numbers of troops decrease and their areas of 
responsibility increase, the importance of intelligence will 
become paramount, so that small forces can be deployed 
optimally. As an example, US Army brigades will receive 
reconnaissance units equipped with new reconnaissance vehicles 
that have multi-sensor systems36 , and there are also plans to 
equip the brigades with their own UAV systems and enable them 
to acquire information directly from JSTARS (Joint Surveillance 
Target Acquisition Radar System) aircraft and other systems 
controlled by the higher echelons.37 
Combat will be more likely to take place in urban areas in 
the future. According to some estimates, approximately 60 - 70% 
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of the world's population will be living in major cities by the 
year 2025, and these will also become areas of concentration 
for industry, commerce and administration. Potential 
adversaries will also more frequently place their key systems 
in urban areas, which will mean that our own troops and 
weapon systems should be capable of operating in urban areas 
as well.38 
The numbers of helicopters and mobile airborne troops will 
increase. Both Great Britain and Germany are just now 
developing air assault brigades in which combat helicopter units 
are combined with airborne units. Battle space control makes it 
possible to use air assault troops effectively without great losses. 
These troops will not replace armoured or mechanised troops, 
but they will increase the tempo of operations and the depth of 
the battlefield.39 
Developments in naval and air forces will follow the same 
trends as in armies. Numbers of personnel and quantities of 
equipment will decrease, and traditional naval artillery, 
bombing and close air support systems will decrease in 
importance at the same time as precision weapon systems gain 
ground. The main emphasis in the development of air forces and 
navies will be on the ability to project power far away from one's 
own areas if needed. The highest priority in the development of 
the world's naval forces will concern the ability to intervene in a 
land battle from the sea, both with long-range weapons systems 
and facilities for landing ground forces in a chosen area. 
The proportion of special to general-purpose forces is 
increasing. Special forces are needed for reconnaissance and 
assault tasks, and also for the ever-increasing numbers of 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Their high 
levels of training and flexibility make them suitable for many 
types of operations. The capacity of special forces for conducting 
intelligence operations will be further developed. 
According to US Army tests, traditional staff and 
headquarters organizations are still relatively functional and 
form a firm basis for the development of staff organizations. 
These will increasingly require more personnel to administer the 
increasing information flows, however, and as operations could 
continue for days or even weeks at a high tempo, there must also 
be sufficient personnel to support round the clock operations. 
Headquarters must also be able to plan and lead joint operations. 
Clearly, brigade, division and army corps level headquarters will 
become larger than they are at present.40 
In the operational sphere, however, there will be a need to 
reduce the number of command levels. In this way the command 
process will become shorter, and it will be possible to increase 
the tempo of an operation 41 . The biggest change in the long 
run will probably be the elimination of the division level, 
accompanied by clear changes in the command structure and 
hierarchies at the brigade - army corps levels. The old rigid, 
scaled command structure will disappear from the supporting 
systems in particular, to be replaced by a net-like command 
structure. 
The use of military force is almost always associated with 
protection of the vital interests of major powers or their 
coalitions. These interests are pursued mainly by political means, 
exerting political, economicl and military pressure if necessary. 
If these measures fail, military operations may be used. The 
preparation of such operations can require significant amounts 
of time, but when force is eventually used, the aim is to achieve 
the goal as quickly as possible, in order to minimize losses both 
to one's own military forces and to the opponents' civilian 
population. Fast action also helps one to reach the goal as soon 
as possible, before international pressure or some other 
consideration forces an end to the operation. 
The Kosovo crisis of 1999 showed clearly the drawbacks of 
a campaign which drags on for a long period of time. During the 
78 days of the air campaign "Allied Force", the pressure to stop 
the air attacks mounted daily and the cohesion of NATO was 
gradually declining. One of the main reasons for this was the 
mounting numbers of civilian casualties among the Serb 
population. 
Another reason for the need to reach the operational 
objectives as quickly as possible is the fact that even the major 
powers have a limited capacity to continue operations for long 
periods of time. The strike by the United States and Great Britain 
against Iraq in December 1998, for example, lasted only four 
days. According to some calculations, this endeavour cost about 
five billion Finnish marks. Approximately 400 cruise missiles are 
reported to have been launched during the operation, which is 
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about 15% of the total US conventional cruise missile 
arsena142 . It would have been almost impossible to continue 
the operation at the same high level of intensity even for a 
matter of several weeks. 
The US armed forces faced similar problems during the 
operation "Allied Force" in Kosovo. The need to avoid collateral 
damage and adverse weather forced them to use a large number 
of precision munitions, so that the consumption became so high 
that the US forces were obliged to accelerate replenishment of 
their supplies. C4 capacity can also be a limiting factor in 
operations. The additional C4 capabilities brought to the area 
during "Allied Force", for example, had a distinct impact on 
other US military commitments worldwide.43 
Instead of engaging from the outset, the major powers tend 
to try to suppress their enemy's key systems, break his will to 
fight and force him into a situation in which he is unable to 
continue the battle. The idea is to isolate the military 
commanders and their staffs from their units and simultaneously 
destroy the command and control structure. Psychological 
operations are intended to reduce morale in the opponent's units 
and to complicate his decision-making. Information- operations 
are especially important in this process. 
On the other hand, there are numerous historical cases that 
show how well-trained, motivated troops have continued 
fighting even though their lines of communication have been cut 
and they have been overwhelmed both materially and in the 
amount of information they have been able to receive. The 
suppression of an opponent's information systems will not be an 
inevitable key to victory in the future, either, for in many cases 
the only efficient way to suppress an opponent's key systems and 
troops is to physically destroy them. It seems to be easier to affect 
the will of the political leadership through precision weapon and 
air strikes than to shake the morale of the troops on the ground.44 
The density of troops in the battlefield will become lower as 
the areas of operation broaden and the numbers of troops 
decrease. The increasing ability to observe and locate targets and 
to destroy them with precision weapons will accelerate this 
development, as armed forces will try to protect their units by 
dispersing them over very large areas45 . Highly developed 
forces planned for mobile operation will be deployed and 
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concentrated for only short periods to conduct attacks, being 
capable of striking throughout the depth of the combat theatre 
simultaneously in order to reach several operational objectives 
at once. 
The size of the unit alone will no longer be decisive when 
estimating the effects and importance of an operation. Even 
small units can conduct fast, well-timed, accurate strikes with 
very powerful precision weapon systems in a very deep area. 
Under these conditions even units of squad or platoon size can 
conduct tactical strikes, which could be of great operational 
importance in revolutionising the boundaries of strategic, 
operational and tactical-level warfare, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Tactical 
Tactical 
Figure 2. 	The boundaries of strategic, operational and tactical-level warfare 
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The future battlefield will be more fragmented. Solid front 
lines will disappear and safe areas will be specifiable more 
correctly in terms of time than space. Logistic and support areas 
will be protected mainly through battle space control rather than 
by the physical deployment of troops, and operations will gain 
greater effect through synergy created by deployment of the 
fighting power of several units and different branches of the 
armed services almost simultaneously and focusing them on 
numerous critical points. These points will be more important to 
the structure of the battlefield than a solid front line. Fighting 
power will increasingly come to be used in small, dispersed, but 
powerful units, and the battlefield will be more flexible than in 
the past, with constant movement and changes in tempo."" 
In order to guarantee rapid success, forces must be able to 
execute their initial operations as quickly as possible, and the 
vanguard must be tailored according to the mission and the 
disposition of the enemy forces. Quick, tactical victories will 
become increasingly important, and may be of operational and 
even strategic importance. The Iraqis lost the Gulf War in 1990 -
1991 so quickly mainly because they were unable to prevent the 
alliance from deploying its forces in the theatre. In the future, no 
enemy will allow the other side to concentrate its troops for such 
a long period if it has any capacity of blocking this.'" 
The most important objective in the early phase of 
operations is to achieve information superiority over the enemy 
by suppressing and blinding its most important intelligence, 
command and control systems. His ability to control his forces 
may also be disrupted by the use of non-nuclear EMP generators, 
space- operated jamming systems or computer viruses. The 
suppression of command systems will normally begin before any 
land or air operations, but may sometimes continue during 
them. 48 
Instead of locating enemy battalions, regiments and artillery 
concentrations, commanders will in the future be more 
interested in how the enemy's information systems work, what 
their weaknesses are, how his decision-making process works, 
what are the critical points in his C3 system and what ability he 
has to affect the commanders' own C3 systems. This will require 
a detailed knowledge of enemy C3 systems. The information will 
have to be collected and analysed during peacetime and various 
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suppression options will have to be modelled in order to allow 
effective final planning and implementation of operations in the 
event of a crisis49 ,so 
In addition to direct destruction, the enemy's intelligence, 
command and control system may be disrupted, deceived or 
overloaded5l , same time as one's own systems have to be 
protected against enemy action52 . At the tactical-operational 
level, information warfare is mostly a matter of command 
warfare. It may be just as important in the future to achieve 
information superiority at the beginning of an operation as it was 
in the past to achieve air superiority 53 , and it will be just as 
important in low-level conflicts as in war54 . 
Fire superiority and manpower superiority will finally be 
achieved with deep, and simultaneous strikes against the enemy, 
once he has lost his capacity to command and control his troops. 
Such strikes are usually aimed at the enemy's centres of gravity, 
but a capability for achieving hits throughout the depth of the 
battle space can enable one to suppress and destroy the enemy 
forces very rapidly, as happened in the Gulf War. The enemy 
can be blinded, demoralised and destroyed by the massed 
firepower of a variety of weapons and precision weapon systems 
used in information operations, and together with the rapid 
movement of combat troops on land and in the air, this will 
enable larger forces to be destroyed with small losses to one's 
own force.ss 
Sophisticated battle space control will facilitate more 
accurate and more economic decision-making and deployment 
of forces56 . Since the achieving of a faster operational tempo 
than the enemy is one of the main methods for gaining one's own 
objectives, it is obvious that the battle tempo must be increased.57 
Special operations are becoming increasingly important for 
two reasons. As the number of troops available decreases, the 
quality of the troops must be higher than before, and secondly, 
special forces are well suited for precise action against selected 
critical points. Even conventional combat troops will have to be 
used in smaller units and for more independent missions. 
In the short term, combat troops will still be led 
hierarchically. Most of the information flow involving support, 
logistics and intelligence information, for example, will be 
distributed in a network manner directly to all those who need 
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such information. The use of both methods will allow control 
over certain some battlefield functions, such as fire support.58 
Although situational awareness will become more accurate 
in the future, it will not be sufficiently well developed to facilitate 
the detailed operational planning of large forces. Commanders 
will still have to be able to make assessments and anticipate 
future developments. In fact, as the operational tempo increases, 
they will have to be able to conduct longer-term assessments of 
possible enemy actions than today, and make very speedy 
decisions if necessary. This will place emphasis on the selection, 
training and exercising of leaders and will create demands for 
longer preparation times. The selection and screening of 
commanders will have to be more thorough than today.59 
Commanders will have to be better able to delegate 
responsibilities to their subordinates in the future, as an 
individual can handle only a limited amount of information at 
once. Troops and strike forces may have to stand idle if 
overburdened staff and commanders cannot process and deliver 
orders quickly enough. The windows of opportunity will be 
smaller in the future than they are today, and this will require 
fast, functional decision-making with adequate attention to 
detail. Delays in reaching decisions can lead to unnecessary 
movements of troops, with the result that they may be directed 
to improper missions or that the few valuable precision weapon 
systems may be used against targets of secondary importance.60 
For these reasons the ability to influence the enemy 
commanders is becoming a more crucial part of operational 
planning. Combining of the effects of psychological operations, 
electronic warfare, deception and physical destruction can 
enable one to influence these people's feelings, motives, objective 
thoughts and capabilities." 
The need to strike key enemy systems in a deep area 
simultaneously will place more demands on co-operation and 
co-ordination of the actions of different branches of the armed 
services. Joint operations will become more frequent, and 
operational-level commands will have to be able to lead joint 
operations employing various capabilities provided by the 
different services. 
International peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
operations of different kinds are also likely to play a significant 
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part among the tasks of the western armed forces. In operations 
of this kind it is vital to achieve information superiority over the 
parties to the conflict and to create an accurate, real-time picture 
of the situation. Situational awareness must be extremely high. 
The conflicting parties are normally capable of using the media 
very skilfully for their own psychological operations and they 
know very well the low casualty tolerance of the peacekeeping 
forces. 
Very similar use must be made of intelligence and C3 
systems in peacekeeping operations as in combat operations, 
except that instead of firepower, more attempts will be made to 
influence the conflicting parties through negotiations, the 
distribution of information, total control of the situation by the 
peacekeeping forces, a show of force if necessary, but actual force 
only as a last resort. Stress will inevitably be laid on 
psychological operations and human intelligence. 
The worldwide media must also be taken into account in 
military operations, as knowledge of a failed military operation 
can reach a home audience at lightning speed, and the major 
powers are especially vulnerable to negative reactions on the 
part of their population unless they are protecting their most 
vital national interests. This is even more obvious in international 
peacekeeping and peace- enforcement operations. 
One famous example is the failed attempt to capture the 
Somalian clan chief Mohammed Aideed in October 1993. The US 
Special Forces involved were forced to withdraw when they 
faced fierce resistance, and the news teams sent home to the US 
audience pictures of celebrating Somalis dragging the body of a 
dead US helicopter pilot through the streets of Mogadishu. This 
resulted in huge political pressure on the administration, and 
forced the United States to withdraw its troops from Somalia. 
Thus a tactical mission that was tied to an operational objective 
resulted in a strategic failure.62 
Developments in troops, tactics, operational skills and command 
and control in Russia 
Since the development of the Russian army is based very 
largely on the threat posed by a potential enemy, the Russians 
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make a careful study of events in the western world. In the 1980's 
they were interested above all in smart and precision weapons 
and electronic warfare, and they have now noted the importance 
of information operations63 . Some theoreticians even claim that 
information warfare against Russia has already begun.64 
The Russian armed forces are currently developing more 
slowly and with less certainty than those of the western world 
due to the unstable political situation and weak economy. Also, 
the basis for development has been weakened by the decrease in 
the overall capabilities of the armed forces during the last 
decade. They have also diminished in size during the last year, 
mostly because of weak funding and the failure of the 
conscription system to work properly.65 
Most units of the Russian armed forces are incapable of 
conducting normal training or daily service and maintenance 
routines. Army units were able to carry out about 60 - 70% of 
their planned unit training programme in 1998 and about half of 
the planned exercises at the regiment level, while the Air Force 
was supplied with only about 29% of its fuel requirement, so that 
pilots were flying only 50 - 60 hours a year, and even less than 
that in many units. The Navy similarly has problems in 
maintaining its ships, and most of the training takes place in port 
because the lack of fuel makes it impossible to train at sea. The 
personnel structure of the armed forces is unbalanced, as there 
are almost as many officers as there are enlisted service-men."" 
Another problem for the armed forces is the ageing of their 
material. The procurement of new equipment has been reduced 
in recent years and is now totally inadequate to maintain a 
modern structure. In 1998 the armed forces received only 15 
main battle tanks, 250 armoured personnel carriers, 10 self-
propelled artillery pieces, 40 helicopters, 40 fighter planes and 
two submarines. No major surface ships or transport planes were 
obtained. These numbers were increased slightly in 1999, but in 
order to maintain an overall equipment age of less than 15 years, 
the purchasing programme should be dramatically increased.67 
The problem is appreciated among the political leadership, 
and an effort has been made to modernise the armed forces. After 
much negotiation, the president of Russia finally accepted a plan 
for the reform of the armed forces on 9th June 1997. The plan 
extends to the year 2005, but it has started slowly due to 
economic difficulties. The reform in general is still following the 
original schedule, however, and it is intended that the armed 
forces should have been converted by the end of the year 2000 
into a totally professional force with a peacetime strength of 
about 1.2 million men68 . This will nevertheless probably not be 
possible, and the replacement of conscripts with professional 
soldiers may actually be completed only around the year 2010.69 
The military reform will call for a complete change in 
Russia's division into military territories, the numbers of troops, 
structures and organizations. The number of separate armed 
services will be reduced from five to three, and a new territorial 
system will be created in which country is divided into six 
strategic regions.70 
The military reform will also require modernisation and 
streamlining of the command structure, at the same time as all 
development and procurement of new weapons systems will be 
concentrated in hands of the Ministry of Defence. The role of the 
General Staff in defence planning will increase and mobilisation 
readiness will be strengthened. A regional logistic system 
capable of supporting all the security forces will be developed, 
and operational and combat training will be increased. 
It is also planned to form units that will remain on constant 
alert in the border districts. The ground forces would comprise 
10 divisions and 15 - 20 brigades/regiments, which would be 
almost fully manned and in a constant state of readiness, while 3 
- 5 airborne divisions and 2 - 3 airborne brigades would be 
maintained at the same level of readiness. The mobility of the 
strategic forces will be developed, and similar forces on constant 
alert will probably be formed in the Air Force and Navy. At the 
beginning of 1999 there were ten formations on constant alert in 
the Army, including three combined arms divisions, four 
combined arms brigades and three airborne formations7l .72 
The forces will be divided structurally into three parts. Units 
on continuous readiness will be used to protect the nation's 
borders and to respond to possible crises, together with troops 
belonging to the Ministry of the Interior. Troops at lower 
levels of readiness will be responsible for allowing additional 
mobilisation and for the maintenance and stockpiling of 
material. These units will only be partially manned but will have 
most of their material ready at their depots. In case of war they 
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will be reinforced to full combat strength, and will be used to 
reinforce the troops that are already on the alert. 
GENERAL 
STAFF 
(MoD) 
UNITS  IN 	UNITS  IN 	STRATEGIC 
CONTINUOUS 	READINES 	RESERVES 
READINESS 
Figure 3. The division of troops in Russia 
The third part will consists of strategic reserves that can be 
used to increase military strength in the case of war in order to 
defend the country against enemy offensives and to destroy 
enemy troops. This structure is also suited to offensive 
operations and makes it possible to deploy troops rapidly to 
different parts of the country and to increase forces in threatened 
areas in a flexible manner. 
According to the plans, Russia should be capable of waging 
a large-scale war by 2010 - 2015. This will be achieved by 
developing a mobilisation system based on areas of 
responsibility defined in terms of operational-strategic regions. 
The mobilisation system can be used to reinforce the readiness 
troops with 10 -15 divisions that are maintained at less than their 
full wartime strength. The system would also create the capacity 
to form 20 - 30 new divisions from the strategic reserves.73 
There will be no opportunity for new, larger armament or 
development programmes during the military reform, but 
instead the procurement of new material is to start after 2005, 
once the organizational changes are complete. The constant 
readiness formations will receive the best equipment currently 
available, but due to the poor economic situation, it will take a 
long time to raise the military capability sufficiently. Some 
experts estimate that even in the best-case scenario, a credible 
and reasonable defence capability cannot be achieved before the 
year 201074. Until then the primary Russian defence capability 
will be based on a few Army, Navy and Air Force constant 
readiness forces, and particularly on nuclear weapons. 
The planning of the Russian armed forces is directed at 
being prepared for both a large-scale war and local conflicts, 
although the difference between these two models is reduced 
under conditions of diminishing economic resources. Given the 
weaknesses of the conventional armed forces, the role of the 
nuclear forces has becomes more significant, although the 
development of conventional weapon systems is continuing in 
the framework of the available resources. it is hoped to be able to 
provide the forces with modern equipment in the course of time, 
including precision weapons systems and equipment for 
information warfare, as the economic situation improves.75 
On the other hand, it is difficult to keep abreast of the rapid 
progress being made in information technologies. Although 
Russia's development in certain areas of defence material is the 
best in the world, the country on the whole is clearly falling 
behind the west, especially on the sphere of information 
technologies. It is estimated that Russia occupies 41st place in 
the world in telecommunications, having fallen at least 15 - 20 
years behind the western countries. It still does not have a 
national computer network, and it is ranked 34th in the world in 
the number of computers per person 76 . 
Although the armed forces estimate that they need 450 000 
computers, there were only about 25 000 of these available in 
1996. Even if they were able to start mass production of 
computers, it would take 5 - 8 years to produce all those needed. 
A more realistic time frame would be closer to 15 years." 
One major problem is the limited resources of the Russian 
school system and the poor level of education of the people in 
general, which is reflected in the armed forces in the form of lower 
standards of schooling among recruits. Earlier, conscripts were 
required to have at least intermediate-level schooling, but this was 
dropped from the new school law, so that the average level of 
schooling in the 1995 draft was seven classes or less. According to 
the military authorities, this level is inadequate for learning how to 
use modern fire control and weapon systems78 .79  
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Moreover, levels of manpower and equipment in the 
Russian army will decrease in the future. Instead of heavy 
divisions, smaller, more mobile and flexible brigades will be 
developed. Some divisions have already been transformed into 
peacetime brigades, and brigades will become the most 
important unit in the army in the future, replacing divisions80 
The support elements of the brigades will grow in order to make 
them capable of more independent operation, and a corps-
brigade structure will be employed in the most important units, 
allowing better flexibility and independence of operation.8' 
At the battalion level and below the Russians will keep their 
traditional forms of organization and material well into the 
future. Although information technologies will be developed, 
the restricted resources will mean that modern equipment 
cannot be deployed at the lower organization levels. 
Reconnaissance is also being emphasised in the Russian 
armed forces. This is conducted mainly by traditional armoured 
and patrol reconnaissance units, but UAV and electronic 
intelligence systems are under development. It is planned that 
the primary ground units of the readiness forces, the manoeuvre 
force corps, should include an armoured reconnaissance 
brigade, UAV battalions and electronic intelligence battalions, 
while the mechanised infantry and armoured brigades should 
have an organic armoured reconnaissance battalion."z 
The importance of space-based intelligence systems is well 
understood by Russian planners, but due to the poor economic 
situation these systems will continue to decrease in number and 
capacity in the coming decade. 
The Soviet Union was one of the forerunners in the 
development of airborne and air assault troops, and the air 
component of the land forces is expected to become even more 
important in the future. Large-scale airdrops are seen as 
impractical high-risk operations, however, due to the improved 
air-defence systems and fast-reacting, long-range area firing 
systems possessed by potential adversaries. 
The airborne forces have evolved into more of a helicopter-
transported force. The numbers of airborne and air assault troops 
will decrease to some extent, but their proportion relative to the 
land forces will in fact increase. According to existing plans, the 
air assault troops will be developed for use as mechanised air 
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units, troops that would include air assault infantry, armoured 
transport helicopters and combat and fire support helicopters, 
to be accompanied by close air support aircraft. These units 
would be used much like mechanised infantry units supported 
by main battle tanks are used today, but with better mobility, 
and their combat capacity would be greater than that of 
traditional airborne troops. Development is fairly slow, however, 
due to the lack of resources. If the armed forces cannot begin to 
acquire new helicopters within five years, it is estimated that in 
a worst-case scenario the Russian armed forces will not have a 
single large combat helicopter unit operational by the year 
2010.83 
The development of air and naval forces in Russian 
represents an attempt to follow the same trends as in the western 
countries, but the lack of resources only allows a small part of 
the air force and navy to be maintained at modern standards. 
Levels of equipment and manpower are dropping, and 
organizational levels are being reduced at the same time. 
Special forces have proved useful in Chechnya and in other 
crises in the Caucasus, and cuts have been proportionally smaller 
among the special forces than among the other troops. The 
special forces are being developed in the same direction as in the 
Western countries, with plans to phase out the conscript system 
and make these forces totally professional eventually. 
The Russians believe that the importance of reconnaissance 
and strike systems formed by integrating intelligence, C3 and 
precision weapon systems will increase in future operations84 
The massive use of firepower will mean that even large-scale 
wars will be of short duration. At the same time, however, the 
importance of information and psychological operations will 
increase, a fact which according to Russian theoreticians, has not 
been properly understood in the past. 
The Russians can see that they are clearly lagging behind 
the United States in the technological sector of the development 
of information warfare, and realize that they have to use all 
possible means and maximise the potential of their own 
strengths to balance this. This will imply putting a lot of effort 
on developing the theory of information warfare operations and 
they also intend to employ their perceived advantages in the 
psychological sector.85 
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No official military definition of information warfare has 
been endorsed to date in Russia. The most authoritative person 
to define the term so far has been Vladimir Pirumov, a retired 
admiral who has recently been serving as Scientific Advisor to 
the President of Russia. 
According to Pirumov, information warfare can be carried 
on in peacetime as well. When discussing the wartime use of 
information warfare, he states that: "Information warfare in 
operations is the aggregate of all the coordinated measures and 
actions of troops conducted according to a single plan in order 
to gain or maintain an information advantage over the enemy 
during the preparation or conduct of operations. An information 
advantage assumes that one's own command and control 
components are informed to a greater degree than those of the 
enemy, that they possess more complete, detailed, accurate and 
timely information than does the enemy, and that the condition 
and capabilities of one's own C2 system make it possible to 
actualise this advantage in combat actions of troops.""" 
The Chechnya crisis in 1995 - 1996 is mentioned as an 
example of a war where information- and psychological 
operations were clearly deficient. The Russians project that in the 
future even strategic aims could be achieved by combining the 
use of precision weapon systems and non-military functions 
(media) in information and -psychological operations, thus 
allowing the enemy's C3 system to be suppressed, its command 
ability to be impeded, significant objects and forces to be 
destroyed and its psyche and morale to be weakened. On the 
other hand, the presence of international media is increasingly 
important, because of the ability to globalise the crisis and affect 
its end result.87 
The Russians believe that the probability of local crises and 
conflicts occurring within one military district is increasing, and 
are prepared to form an operational-strategic command on the 
base of a military district headquarters to deal with this kind of 
crisis. Such a command would have control over all the troops 
from the armed forces, the Ministry of the Interior, the border 
guards, the government's communication and information 
administration (FAPSI) and the security service (FSB). These 
would make up an operational force group. 
The Russians intend to win such local wars with the high- 
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readiness troops that the operational-strategic command would 
have at its disposal. The operational force group may comprise 
an airborne division, a special forces brigade, 2 - 4 tactical missile 
brigades, 2 - 4 rocket artillery brigades, an air-army and a mobile 
force corps, for example. 
OPREATIONAL 
FORCE GROUP 
COMMANDER .......................... 
STAFF 
UNITS 
	 .... 	
FORCE 
	
FORCES 
	 BRIGADES 	BRIGADES.. 	
ARMY 
 .. 	 ..... 	...... ITEPOTATRPSl 	OAVOIOIE BRIGADE  
	TACTICAL 
ARTILLERY 
AND 	
R
R 	• SUP1P1OflSIl1G 
FSB 
Figure 4. 	Organization of an operational force group. 
The mobile force corps, which would normally comprise 1-
2 motorised infantry or armoured divisions, 1 - 2 motorised 
infantry armoured brigades, an air assault brigade, 1- 2 artillery 
brigades and other support troops, would be the most important 
manoeuvre force under the operational-strategic command. In 
addition there could also be units from the Ministry of the 
Interior, border guards and security services." 
Such an operational-strategic command would be in charge 
of the army and corps level operations and the deployment of 
tactical units, although some units might have more independent 
missions. Manoeuvres and offensive actions are emphasised at 
the tactical and operational levels in the Russian art of war, 
whereas defensive operations are conducted temporarily, 
only when the situation does not allow offensive operations. 
The use of surprise electronic and fire strikes followed by fast 
manoeuvres is typical of offensive operations, and the use of air 
power is emphasised because of the ability to concentrate this 
rapidly and use it deep in the rear of the enemy.89 
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Figure 5. Organization of a mobile force corps. 
In the preparation phase of an offensive, the operational-
strategic command will normally conduct an information 
warfare operation, with the principal object of finding out the 
detailed deployment of the enemy forces, their combat capacity 
and how the central C3 system works. The other important aim 
is to disturb the enemy's military and political decision-making 
system. The information operation must be started by deceiving 
the enemy about one's own actions and disrupting the 
functioning of his intelligence system. This deception is 
considered important, as it is almost impossible to hide one's 
own preparations and the formation of an operational force 
group completely, which means that the enemy must be 
prevented from starting any significant counter actions at the 
right locations or at the right time."' 
Deception can be achieved by spreading false information 
via one's own media, disrupting the functioning of the enemy's 
media and using one's own forces and firepower in a deceptive 
manner. Information operations should be conducted in such a 
way that the enemy does not become aware that the individual 
parts of the operation belong to a co-ordinated action.91  
During the information operation the intelligence and fire 
co-ordination elements of the operational-strategic command 
and mobile corps form a detailed picture of the location of the 
enemy's troops and their most important weapons and C3 
systems. This is done mainly by the use of electronic intelligence, 
air reconnaissance and special forces. Integrated combinations 
for "conducting reconnaissance-strike operations can be 
formed out of the command, intelligence and weapons 
systems in order to locate and destroy targets deep in the rear of 
the enemy almost in real time.92 
These reconnaissance-strike operations can be launched as 
soon as sufficient information is gained, even when there is no 
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overall superiority over the adversary in troops or weapon 
systems. The most important consideration is the number and 
capacity of the precision weapons, air forces, EW systems and 
reconnaissance-strike force combinations which can be used to 
achieve air- supremacy and superior firepower in the combat 
area93 . Long-range reconnaissance-strike force combinations 
and air forces can be used to suppress the enemy's centrally 
controlled long-range weapon systems and command centres at 
the beginning of the operation, while fire strikes prevented the 
movement of enemy troops. In this way, the enemy's capacity to 
continue operations can be eliminated and armed resistance can 
be brought to an end.94 
The idea in a reconnaissance-strike operation is to destroy 
the targets in accordance with the objectives of the operation, and 
the length of the operation will depend on the enemy's defensive 
system and level of preparedness, but would probably be 1 - 3 
days. In order to safeguard the freedom of action of 
reconnaissance-strike force combinations and air forces, the 
enemy's air defence system and air force units will be suppressed 
in the first phase. If the operation is to be followed by a ground-
force offensive, suppressing of the enemy's C3 system will create 
suitable conditions for this. Breaking down the defences in 
certain areas before the offensive begins will enable ground 
forces to manoeuvre deep in to the enemy's rear. According to 
Russian estimates, at least 30% of the enemy's combat systems 
must be suppressed before the ground offensive. The idea is that 
reconnaissance-strike operations should extend to the whole 
depth of the operation area.95 
In the reconnaissance-strike phase the enemy's key systems 
should be suppressed by tactical missiles, radar homing missiles 
and other precision weapons. This will reduce the amount of 
ordnance needed, lower the logistic burden and shorten the time 
needed for the operation. Simultaneous electronic jamming will 
increase the effect of the fire strikes. On the other hand, 
conventional artillery and rocket artillery can be used against 
enemy troops that are operating behind their own lines even in 
situations where targeting is based on uncertain information.96 
The main objective in a land offensive following a 
reconnaissance-strike operation is to seize key areas which are 
critical for one's own operations and those of the enemy and to 
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destroy objects that are vital to the enemy's operations. Forces 
should be dispatched to their objectives from several directions, 
and there should always be an element of deception in the 
operation. In an offensive operation the enemy must be denied 
the ability to gain vital information97 , at the same time as his 
command and intelligence systems are loaded by deception 
operations conducted on his flanks and rear areas and by 
repeated feint-attacks made before the real offensive begins98 . 
The enemy's strong points should be by-passed as much as 
possible, even by using difficult terrain if required, and the 
offensive should be supported by air assault operations in the 
enemy's rear areas. Air assault troops must seize key areas that 
are critical to the land forces' manoeuvring ability and destroy 
enemy command centres and reserves. It is critical to maintain 
the movement of land forces in all situations. It should be 
possible in a local war to reach distant objectives located at 
depths of 100 - 150 kilometres in 4 - 6 days.99 
In a large-scale war an operational-strategic command may 
control 2 - 4 armies, 1 - 2 corps, an airborne division, a special 
forces brigade, 2 - 4 tactical missile brigades, 2 - 4 rocket artillery 
brigades and 1- 2 air forces. At least one of the corps would be a 
mobile force corps at a high state of readiness. Each army would 
contain 2 - 3 motorised infantry divisions, an armoured division 
and support troops. 
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Figure 6. 	An operational-strategic command preparing for a large-scale 
war. 
Most of the available troops would nevertheless be 
mobilised ones whose training and material would be at a lower 
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level than in the case of the readiness forces. While the readiness 
forces would be able to conduct mobile operations and offensives 
deep behind the enemy lines, the mobilised troops would only 
be capable of tactical-level offensives and traditional attrition 
warfare.1°° 
A large-scale offensive might begin in the same way as an 
offensive in a local war. As the majority of the forces would not 
have the capacity to form integrated reconnaissance-strike force 
combinations, precise firepower would be supplemented with 
voluminous firepower. Massive fire support would be used to 
break the enemy's front-line defence in certain directions. After 
the reconnaissance-strike operation, the mobile forces corps and 
airborne division would be directed deep into the enemy's rear 
areas, in order to suppress his command centres and reserves. 
When the troops and objectives that are vital to the continuation 
of operation of the enemy's main forces have been destroyed or 
cut off, the main forces can be destroyed by an offensive on the 
part of one's own main forces supported with massive fire."' 
Once operations have started, a parallel planning process is 
initiated, in which the basis for planning is given over to the 
subordinate commands while the higher command is still 
conducting its own planning. The plans made by the subordinate 
commands still have to be accepted by the higher command, 
however, before they can be put into effect. The planning process 
in an army takes about 2 - 3 days, but it is to be hoped that this in 
particular and also the working of the mobile forces corps 
headquarters can be speeded up in future by means of modern 
computer systems. Computer applications enable different 
solutions to be compared and information, orders and plans to 
be sent between different headquarters.102 
The Russians do not yet have the equipment to conduct 
operations of this kind, however, and their ability to conduct 
deep, almost real-time, combined reconnaissance-strike 
operations and related psychological operations against an 
enemy's command and information systems is limited. The 
biggest problems concern the low capacity of the C3I systems 
and the lack of proficiency on the part of the leaders. The limited 
numbers of precision weapon systems and the slowness of the 
intelligence system are still compensated for by massed 
firepower. The level of readiness shown by the enemy is thus an 
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essential consideration, as an enemy at a low state of readiness 
can be expected to be defeatable with a much lower level of 
firepower. Consequently the ability to achieve surprise in all 
operations is considered important.103 
The Russians also believe that the future battlefield will be 
fragmented, and there will be no clear front lines. Fighting will 
spread rapidly over the whole depth of the operational area, and 
operational and tactical movement will increase, at the same time 
as offensive and defensive operations will be connected together 
in a seamless manner. Lower command levels must be able to 
fight independently, and even at the battalion and company 
levels the units will be fighting mobile battles that extend over a 
large area. Where this occurs the troops must be controlled in a 
coherent manner and superior units must be able to support 
them with effective reconnaissance-strike force combinations.104 
Recent developments in the Russian armed forces and 
operational skills have been much affected by the new war in 
Chechnya that started in 1999. This has proved to be a double-
edged weapon for the armed forces. Parts of the forces have 
received valuable combat experience, and the air force pilots 
participating in the campaign have clocked up numerous flying 
hours, for example, all of which will increase the combat capacity 
of the armed forces. On the other hand, it is the special forces, 
airborne troops, marines and the most experienced air force 
pilots, that are carrying the major burden in the war. These few 
parts of the armed forces that were already at a high level of alert 
are being worn down by it, while at the same time the war effort 
is diverting a lot of personnel and material resources from other 
parts of the armed forces, thereby slowing down the military 
reform. The state has covered some of the additional expenses 
from sources outside the military budget, but this will probably 
not cover all the cost and will definitely not make up for the 
losses among the most experienced officers. 
In order to strengthen the armed forces, Vladimir Putin, 
when Prime Minister, promised to increase investments by the 
armed forces by 50% in 2000, implying funds of about FIM 12 
billion for that year. The spending is intended to create a modern, 
mobile army equipped with high-precision weapons. Most of the 
funding will be taken up, however, in modernising existing 
equipment. This represents a short-term solution, but will not 
reverse the increasing age of Russia's weapon systems. It is also 
uncertain whether the weakening state of the Russian economy 
will allow the promised funding to be arranged for the armed 
forces.los 
The war in Chechnya probably will not have any major 
effects on Russian operational skills. The war is seen as a limited 
"police action" against terrorist forces. The undeveloped 
infrastructure of the country and the simple and crude C2 
structure of the guerrilla forces mean that no proper targets are 
presented for information operations. The asymmetric nature of 
the war is pushing the Russian armed forces into relying on 
conventional anti-guerrilla tactics. 
3.3 Conclusions 
Technical development will radically alter warfare in the 
coming decades. In the development of operational skills there 
has for a long time been a desire to conduct deep, mobile warfare 
in order to eliminate the enemy's ability to continue fighting 
without having to resort to costly attrition warfare. 
Developments in military technology will enable this kind of 
warfare to take place in the future. The model is illustrated in the 
figure below. 
The capability for waging information warfare provides the 
developed countries with new opportunities to influence their 
opponents in order to safeguard their own national interests. The 
effects of information warfare are for the time being felt most 
strongly at the strategic level, during the so-called "grey phase" 
before the start of the hostilities. Once hostilities have 
commenced, information warfare at the operational level is 
mostly command warfare. 
39 
of 
mo 
inf The 
,ditional 
aeration 
model 
Figure 7. 	Development of the concept of operations. 
Recent experiences in the Kosovo conflict have proved that 
even the western powers are still incapable of fully enjoying the 
information dominance they had against an underdeveloped 
opponent. Instead of fast, fluid and flexible information 
operations aimed at totally crippling the Serbian military 
command structure and suppressing its army's will to fight, the 
Allies were mostly hunting down and destroying command 
posts and military communication sites. Their inability to affect 
the will of the Serbian population and military made it possible 
for the Serbian political leadership to protract the crisis. 
Real-time command and control, an enlarged battle space 
and 'simultaneously co-ordinated actions in time, space and 
functions are needed in order to rule the battlefield. New 
information systems which facilitate non-hierarchical 
distribution of intelligence, target and other information at all 
levels make it possible to command troops by using net-like 
control instead of a traditional hierarchical structure. The 
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importance of key systems is growing., and electromagnetic 
mastery is decisive for the success of operations. Air and space 
superiority is required to engage the enemy systems quickly 
enough and in a large enough area. If the defender can deny 
information superiority and/or air superiority at least locally for 
a limited time, it can hamper much larger operations. 
This was clearly seen during the Kosovo conflict, where the 
Allies were unable to totally suppress the Serbian air defences, 
which forced the Allied aircraft to operate at higher altitudes and 
in turn made it impossible to use the US Air Force PSYOPS 
planes effectively and hampered efforts to destroy Serbian 
ground forces in Kosovo. 
New technical systems, advanced weapon systems and 
increased mobility of troops will provide opportunities to 
employ entirely new tactics and operational skills. By affecting 
all the enemy's key systems simultaneously for a short time to 
an overwhelming extent and over the whole depth of the 
operation, he can be suppressed immediately, at the very 
beginning of the operation. The distinction between war and 
crisis is diminishing, and armed forces are being asked to operate 
in even more chaotic conditions than ever. 
Apparently separate operations should be made to occur so 
seamlessly that the opponent has difficulties in setting up a clear 
picture of the situation in time. The final goal is to force him to 
submit to one's own will merely by denying him all information 
and reducing his forces and options by the selective use of 
firepower. If this is not enough, the information operations may 
be followed by rapid concentration of land, sea and air 
transportable forces and strikes over the full depth of the 
opponent's operational area, or by the threat of such operations. 
It must be borne in mind, however, that information warfare 
does not mean the end of traditional warfare. The armed forces 
and administrations of underdeveloped countries are not 
dependent on sophisticated C3 systems, and they are capable of 
sustaining quite significant losses. In this situation the only 
effective measure for influencing an opponent is to destroy his 
military power and conquer the country. The same is also valid 
in the case of developed industrial countries, which have such a 
strong desire to maintain national sovereignty that the nation is 
ready to sacrifice a great deal in order to defend it. 
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When fighting against a technically inferior armed force, 
information warfare offers plenty of opportunities to influence 
the enemy. Strikes against communications, transportation 
systems and depots can disrupt the large-scale mobilisation of 
reserves, and the calling-in of reservists can also be delayed by 
disrupting the postal, telecommunications, radio and television 
systems. This can be done by physical destruction, by electronic 
jamming, by saturating them with false information or by 
hampering the operation of computer systems with viruses or 
other means. 
Mobilised troops can be located very quickly and accurately 
with the help of airborne reconnaissance systems. Multi-sensor 
systems can detect targets in ever more difficult conditions, 
which means that the cover offered by the terrain or the weather 
is diminishing. Once revealed, the command, control and 
communication centres can be suppressed by deep strikes, or else 
their functions can be degraded by the methods of electronic 
warfare. The protection of command and communication centres 
is more difficult, because the threats are highly diverse. 
In addition to protection against traditional weapon systems 
and strikes by special forces, there must be a readiness to prevent 
the effects of electronic warfare, EMP weapons and computer 
hacking, all of which can slow down and hamper the command 
process and the conduct of operations. An unclear situation can 
even mean that the decision-making process may be delayed 
further. In this way a technically more advanced opponent can 
guarantee himself an overwhelming tempo of action from the 
beginning of the operation. 
After the opposing forces and their positions have been 
revealed, this information can be processed and distributed to 
one's own troops very quickly, while the enemy forces must be 
kept under constant surveillance. This also enables one to 
maintain a superior tempo at the tactical level. Better developed 
forces can use their firepower more accurately and by-pass 
enemy troop concentrations and positions rapidly. Not even the 
holding of key terrain can guarantee a slowing down of enemy 
movement, as this terrain can be by-passed by air if necessary. 
The indirect fire systems of a technically inferior opponent 
can be located quickly., and the firing units and fire co-ordination 
systems can be suppressed with precision weapons systems, area 
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suppression systems or electronic warfare systems before they 
can affect one's own troops. Slow moving towed artillery and 
mortar systems are especially vulnerable to rapid counter-strikes 
made by integrated intelligence and firepower systems. 
Rear areas are disappearing as operations are spreading in 
depth very rapidly. All the forces that are operating in a combat 
theatre can be engaged around the clock., and thus all troops 
must be able to protect their own activities and positions. They 
must be able either to enter combat against enemy troops or 
cover themselves against enemy fire immediately. 
The special and guerrilla forces that operate behind the lines 
of technically developed armies may not be able to disrupt their 
opponent's actions very effectively. Strikes should be directed 
against the enemy's key systems at a rapid tempo, and not 
against coincidentally met enemy combat and logistic troops, 
and in order to achieve this the special and guerrilla forces need 
an accurate situational picture of the enemy rear areas, functional 
communications and well-trained and equipped forces. 
A capability for operating in urban areas is becoming 
increasingly important. Crucial operations will be conducted in 
such areas in the future, as these are usually also administrative 
and logistic centres. For the defender, however, an urban area 
might offer better protection and cover against modern 
intelligence systems. 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to blind an enemy's 
intelligence systems, because the destruction of a single sensor is 
not enough to suppress the whole system. In order to have the 
desired effect, the system architecture and its key points have to 
be known in detail. The saturation of intelligence systems and 
operational deception are becoming more important. 
Advanced technology will also introduce some weaknesses 
into the systems maintained by the major powers, which a skilful 
opponent can use to his own advantage. Their armed forces will 
come to depend more and more on key systems, and the systems 
will be integrated and warfare more complicated. In this 
situation the degrading of even a few key systems could 
considerably hamper an aggressor's offensive operations. 
In the development of her armed forces Russia is intending 
to follow the trends of the major powers, and particularly of the 
United States. Due to the lack of economic resources, however, 
this development will be slow, and it will probably take several 
decades before is the desired capabilities are achieved. The main 
objective will be to develop a professional force that is capable of 
conducting combined multi-service and special operations, 
taking advantage of modern information technologies and 
developed reconnaissance-strike force combinations. As long as 
this is impossible, the readiness to conduct traditional operations 
will be maintained, including the use of large-scale offensive 
operations with ground forces. These traditional operations will 
be supported in the near future in a limited way by air and naval 
forces, and if necessary, with nuclear arms. The development of 
tactics and operational skills will continue, in order to create a 
basis for the development of new systems and in order to 
provide the capability for putting the new systems to effective 
use as quickly as possible once they are fielded. 
As the Russian armed forces possess relatively few modern 
precision weapon systems and munitions, the lack of accuracy 
in their firepower is compensated for by the use of massive 
firepower and the mobilization of large land forces when 
fighting against a well-prepared, advanced enemy. Combat 
operations would be supported by psychological warfare 
operations. The ability of the Russian armed forces to technically 
degrade enemy command systems, e.g. by using hackers to 
manipulate information, is weak. Therefore the enemy's 
command system must be suppressed mainly by destroying its 
key objects by firepower and by influencing enemy leaders' 
decision-making processes by the methods of psychological 
warfare. 
A large-scale mobilisation commits a large amount of 
resources, however, and takes a lot of time, which gives the 
enemy time for his preparations. In a large-scale offensive 
against a well-prepared enemy it takes longer to achieve one's 
objectives and the risk of casualties to one's own troops is 
greater, arousing political pressure to cease operations. In order 
to avoid these problems, a maximum of surprise is always 
sought. In a surprise operation the objectives may be reached 
with peacetime troops and with a low rate of casualties, as the 
fire preparation will probably be short, consisting mainly of 
limited precision weapon strikes aimed at suppressing the 
enemy's key systems, followed by a rapid strike conducted by 
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special, airborne and mobile forces that are constantly at a high 
level of readiness. 
C3I systems play a crucial role in Russian operations, for 
without them the Russians would not be able to co-ordinate the 
actions of supporting operations by air assault units, long-range 
mobile units and others, including the air force. In order to 
achieve a rapid victory, the main role is played by the air assault 
and mobile units, which are already in a high state of readiness 
in peacetime. If one is able to cause casualties to these units and 
to limit their freedom of action, one is able to prevent the 
Russians from preparing a wider assault and conducting orderly 
and efficient actions with their main forces. 
The next decades will be time of change. Existing force 
structures, tactics and operational thinking, developed during 
the Cold War, will be shaped according to the new reality. New 
techniques will be adopted rapidly, but the old force structures 
and readiness to mobilise large traditional armies will remain 
for some time. Not even the United States has the resources to 
equip all its forces with the newest material suitable for 
information warfare. In most countries forces are divided into 
two classes, elite forces at a high level of peacetime readiness 
and possessing modern equipment, and main forces that have 
older material and need reservists and training before reaching 
combat readiness. 
Participation in international crisis management operations 
will be one of the main missions of the western armed forces in 
the future. Crisis management will increasingly take the form of 
multinational undertakings in which information operations 
play an important role. In Europe these will probably be mainly 
NATO-led or at least based on NATO structures. Troops that are 
sent to these operations must be interoperable with NATO units 
and trained and equipped to conduct multinational information 
operations under NATO leadership. 
45 
4 DEVELOPING FINNISH TACTICAL-
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
4.1 Principles 
The security policy report placed before the Finnish 
Parliament by the government in spring 1997, which covers 
guidelines for developing the Finnish armed forces until the year 
2008, defines the outlines of the country's security policy, which 
should be reviewed and revised where necessary in 2001 and 
2005. This states that the cornerstones of Finnish security policy 
are: 
a credible, independent defence capability, 
military non-alliance in peacetime, and 
membership of the European Union.106 
The crisis and threat models forming the basis for planning 
are the following: 
• political and military pressure with an associated threat, of 
military force or limited use of force, 
• a surprise strategic strike aimed at paralysing and seizing 
vital targets and subjugating the national leadership, and 
• a large-scale offensive with the objective of seizing 
strategically important areas or making use of Finnish 
territory for action against a third party.107 
The wartime forces will be divided into Operational and 
Regional forces. The operational forces will enable the defence 
capability to be increased rapidly and serve as the linchpin of 
the defence effort. These will include the two most capable 
armoured brigades, three type 2005 readiness brigades, six 
Jaeger brigades, other units of the ground forces and most of the 
mobile units of the Navy and Air Force. One of the readiness 
brigades will also be intended to perform peacekeeping and 
crisis management tasks. An evaluation will be made of the 
possibilities for the Navy and Air Force to participate in crisis 
management. 
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Figure 8. The Finnish wartime operational forces. 
The Regional forces will provide the whole country with a 
defence shield. They are intended to perform combat and 
support tasks that are limited to a specific area or target. The 
most important of these are thell regional brigades, with their 
tasks of defending key areas.108 
The Command Staff is the most important operational staff 
in the Finnish military chain of command. Finland is divided into 
three Commands, which are responsible for defence 
preparations, increasing readiness, and conducting defence 
operations. The Defence Staff allocates operational brigades and 
sorties to the Commands, or units of the Air Force and the 
Maritime Force for implementing counter-attacks. The Military 
Districts, which are subordinated to the Commands, are 
responsible for regional defence in their own areas. The corps 
headquarters would be used for conducting operational counter-
attacks under the command and control of the Defence Staff and 
the Commands. 
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Current defence planning is based on the estimate that the 
defence appropriation will remain at the present level, which is 
some FIM 9.5 billion annually until 2004, when it will decrease 
slightly. As the present level is approximately 1.6% of the gross 
national product, it is assumed that the proportion will decrease 
to 1.3 % by 2008. The plans are that more than FIM 27 billion will 
be spent on the purchase of materials during the years 2000 -
2008, a considerable proportion of which will go on the electronic 
warfare systems and C3I systems needed by the rapid 
deployment units of all three services.109  
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Figure 9. The Chain of Command in the Finnish Defence Forces. 
The threat model guiding the development of the Finnish 
defence forces has not changed significantly. The only new 
elements are the possibility of a strategic surprise strike and the 
possibility of an adversary threatening Finland with 
sophisticated weapon systems and other means from a long 
distance. In view of the conclusions reached in the previous 
chapter, technical developments will not increase the operational 
- tactical level requirements for the defence of Finland, as 
corresponding requirements have already existed for some time. 
From the Finnish point of view, the greatest challenges will 
arise as limited resources have to be adapted to broadening 
requirements. Developing defence capabilities to meet these 
requirements will be an expensive and lengthy process. In order 
to maximise efficiency when using the limited resources, the 
existing and already functioning parts of the defence 
establishment must be put to best use. The same principle must 
be followed when considering the use of resources for the civil 
society. 
Sophisticated societies are always subject to distraction. On 
the other hand, sophisticated technology will strengthen the 
defence forces' capabilities for fighting or protecting society 
against the new threats of the information era. Finland is an 
advanced information society equipped with a modern 
infrastructure, and its telecommunication and computer 
networks are especially sophisticated. The percentage of mobile 
telephone and Internet users within the population is among the 
highest in the world, for example. 
Finland is participating in the worldwide development of 
high technology, thanks largely to Nokia's remarkable standing 
in the international telecommunications business. A well-
functioning education system and a high overall level of 
education favours the introduction of advanced systems. Each 
Finnish citizen receives 9 - 12 years of general schooling before 
beginning vocational education, and the level of education is 
high by international standards. Finland has a large number of 
universities relative to its population, and, of course a significant 
amount of research and development activities, especially 
related to information technology. 
As an independent nation, Finland plans to defend herself 
on her own soil. Even if the suppression of key systems in society 
were to cause severe problems, Finnish independence could not 
be threatened without a foreign military presence or at least 
partial occupation. The will to defend the nation and readiness 
for armed conflict is, according to the latest surveys, extremely 
high110 . This strong will for national defence, ingrained for 
decades, tends to sustain itself, so that a potential adversary 
would be required to plan for the use of a significant amount of 
military power in order to achieve control over Finnish territory. 
The objective of Finland's national defence is to prevent an 
enemy from physically seizing the key areas and suppressing the 
key systems in society and in the armed forces. According to the 
accepted doctrine, the enemy would be worn down and delayed 
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over the whole depth of the area and once weakened, could be 
stopped in pre-selected areas and defeated by operational 
counter-attacks in decisive battles."' 
When developing our forces in the direction of information-
age warfare, it is reasonable to ask whether this scheme will 
remain valid in the future. Conventional ideas about repelling 
an attack and defeating an enemy's attacking force may have to 
be re-thought. 
Certain basic flaws and strengths can be discerned in the 
Finnish defence strategy which must be noted and recognised 
when assessing future development opportunities. Under the 
special conditions prevailing in this country it is even possible 
that some weaknesses could be converted to strengths. Our force 
structure can be seen to be unnecessary large, especially if the 
capabilities of our forces are measured by the amount of modern 
equipment possessed. Parts of our forces are today equipped 
with material which is both quantitatively and qualitatively 
inadequate for the battlefield of the future. On the other hand, 
the great size of the mobilisation army, based on general 
conscription, clearly raises the morale of the people, a factor of 
strategic importance. The force structure nevertheless includes a 
relatively large proportion of totally defensive elements., 
creating a situation of the kind that almost always leaves the 
initiative with the adversary. 
One of our greatest strengths on the information-age 
battlefield is still the advantage of fighting in a familiar area and 
under familiar conditions. Operating on our own soil, the 
establishment of C3, intelligence and logistic systems is easier 
and operations are easier to conduct. The fact that some of the 
troops have quite modest communications systems based on 
older techniques actually makes them almost immune to the 
latest forms of electronic warfare. 
The basic laws of warfare will remain, despite the fact that 
technical development is moving extremely fast. On the 
battlefield the decisive operational level factors that will remain 
in the future are efficiency of action, tempo, initiative, the 
element of surprise and optimal use of force. Combat is still a 
contest between two opponents, who do their utmost to be faster, 
more cunning, more systematic and more efficient than the other 
side. It is not important how much better one is; the essential 
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thing is to gain a relative advantage over the other side by being 
just sufficiently better. 
When preparing to operate against forces that use 
information-age technologies, the most import objectives for 
development are: 
• high levels of readiness with the highest quality troops, 
• a flexible, reliable C3I system in a constant state of high 
readiness, which leads to battle space control, 
• adequate battle tempo, 
• ability to optimise the use of force according to the situation, 
and 
• battle endurance. 
In planning and conducting operations, the Finnish terrain 
and conditions should be utilised to provide the most favourable 
placement of units and the optimisation of tactics, thus creating 
as advantageous a battlefield equation as possible. An 
adversary's caution can often be used against him, since he will 
endeavour to minimise the risk to his own forces by "keeping 
them out of "harm's way" until he can be sure of the success of 
his operation. 
The uniqueness of the Finnish defence concept should be 
used to advantage when developing future plans. The role of the 
local defence troops should be emphasised in the near future, as 
the development of a local defence capability is probably one of 
the most cost-effective methods of raising the overall capacity to 
defend the country against a large-scale offensive. 
Technical development should also cause weaknesses in the 
enemy, which we must be able to use to our own benefit. Under 
Finnish conditions these weaknesses will probably include: 
• reduced personnel strength, which undermines battle 
endurance and the ability to sustain casualties, 
• increased dependence on continuous logistic services, and 
• an increase in the number of critical systems. 
A basic assumption in our situation must be that, the 
enemy's personnel and equipment resources will always to a 
large degree be overwhelming. In order to restore the balance, 
we must concentrate on 
51 
• disturbing the enemy's command structure, 
• maintaining our own command capability, 
• maintaining a superior battle tempo, at least in the critical 
phases, 
• specifying optimal objectives for the use of force with regard 
to time, place and function, 
• using our own forces economically, but without avoiding 
risks when required, and 
• maintaining superior morale, discipline and spirit.1' 
4.2 Development of operational art and tactics 
Warfare is based on constants, and the possibilities enabled 
by these constants must be exploited in operational planning and 
in combat. By creating circumstances where relative strength is 
achieved in as many areas of warfare as possible, strategic 
objectives can be more easily achieved. Operational art and skill 
is required for creating such circumstances. 
The importance of operational skill will be emphasised in 
the future battlefield, because this makes it possible to employ 
tactics which support strategic objectives. Advantage should be 
taken of all possible systems and structures available in these 
operations. The quantities of troops and systems employed will 
not be the most important factors when we are conducting 
operations in the future, however, for the most important 
elements in achieving success are an operational concept that is 
tied to time, place and function together with an objective. Even 
small units can achieve an objective that is of significant long-
range importance. 
On the future battlefield the adversary will already have 
made preparations in peacetime which are directed at achieving 
information superiority, with the intention of creating conditions 
for air and fire superiority. In the last phase, if necessary, the 
opponent can manoeuvre in order to achieve local superiority in 
numbers and combat capacity. In its simplest form, the aim when 
developing tactics and operational art should be to prevent the 
realization of these superiority models. 
Smaller national defence forces cannot base their planning 
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on complete battle space control as do the major powers. Greater 
advantage may be gained by concentrating on areas of technical 
development, which complement sound operational planning 
and maximise one's own strengths. 
The major powers begin both large-scale offensive 
operations and strategic surprise strikes with the achievement of 
information superiority, which is followed by special force 
strikes and reconnaissance-strike operations carried out by the 
various services to suppress the defender's key systems. This 
phase is followed, if necessary, with attacks by mobile forces 
from land, sea or air. As operations progress, the attacker must 
move considerable numbers of forces through land areas to his 
operational and strategic objectives. 
To counter an attack by a major power, the defender's 
intelligence and C3 systems, air defence system and long-range 
weapons systems must be protected. Only in this way can the 
aggressor's air and fire superiority be temporarily suppressed in 
limited areas in conjunction with the defender's own operational 
counter-attacks. Key systems must be defended by troops that 
are at a high level of readiness, and then later with mobilised 
local troops. 
According to the Finnish defence doctrine, the attrition of 
enemy forces must commence at the border. Our efforts should 
be directed especially against the enemy's key systems, because 
this is the best way of hampering his overall operations. The 
enemy has to be denied freedom of operation, and this is best 
accomplished by active, mobile troops, since troops that are 
positioned for static defence may be suppressed or bypassed. 
Finland is geographically a fairly large country (338,000 
square km). It is not possible to achieve detailed, accurate real-
time situational awareness of the entire landmass with limited 
resources. Therefore, we must concentrate on detailed situational 
awareness covering only the most strategic areas. The wooded 
terrain and extreme weather conditions increase the capability 
requirements placed on intelligence and reconnaissance systems. 
These systems must provide multi-sensor capabilities and 
be suitable for easy movement by air or on the ground. The most 
capable intelligence and reconnaissance systems must be massed 
in the most important areas in order to create and maintain the 
required situational awareness, while in other less critical areas 
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situational awareness should be based on the information 
gathered and maintained by the units in their areas of 
responsibility and interest. These units collect and disseminate 
surveillance information by means of a fixed intelligence 
network. 
Critical troop formations must be kept beyond the reach of 
enemy firepower until they are committed to battle, and since 
highly developed intelligence systems will make it very difficult 
to maintain the security of one's own force's movements in the 
future, the importance of deception operations will increase. By 
dispersing the troops, keeping them constantly on the move and 
using deception it should be possible to prevent the enemy from 
bringing his long-range firepower into play113 . Operational 
security must be emphasised at all times, and deception 
operations should be planned and led by local commands. 
The enemy's technical capabilities must be taken into 
account in operational planning and the execution of operations, 
and since it will probably be impossible to protect larger troop 
concentrations against enemy intelligence efforts, it will be much 
more important to disguise the operational intent, e.g. by way of 
an adequately large-scale deception operation. In order to make 
a deception operation credible, it should be planned and co-
ordinated by an operational level headquarters, but its execution 
should be assigned to regional/territorial units in order to save 
operational units for the true effort. The plan should include 
alternative actions to allow for altered requirements as the 
operation unfolds. 
It will probably be very difficult on the battlefield of the 
future to define and locate the enemy's order of battle and his 
principal targets. Optimising the use of friendly forces will be 
difficult for all staff levels. Opportunities for independent actions 
and local initiative should be supported operationally by 
guaranteeing appropriate preconditions and sufficient resources. 
The operational staffs will be expected to be able to control a 
complex force composed of brigades, battalions, regional units 
and units from the different services. 
The centres of gravity against which troops, systems and 
material are targeted should be determined on functional rather 
than regional criteria. Rather than simply numbers of units, these 
centres of gravity should be determined by the desired results 
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and one's own operational goals. The goal should be to strike at 
the enemy's weaknesses and vital activities., so that Iinstead of 
aiming the operational counter-attack against the enemy's first 
or second echelon, the centre of gravity may in fact be the 
headquarters commanding and controlling the operation. A 
strike against such a target could be executed by special forces or 
accurate long-range weapon systems, for example. 
Echelons as such will lose their importance in the flexible, 
fragmented battlefield future, where it will not always be 
necessary to aim at the full operational depth of the enemy. Since 
a future adversary might strengthen his first echelon at the 
expense of the second, it may be essential to concentrate on the 
attacking the first echelon instead of the follow-on forces. 
Operational counter-attacks require sufficient force, which 
should no longer be measured by the number of units but rather, 
as mentioned earlier, by their performance. In order to optimise 
the performance of limited resources, all the services must co-
operate smoothly. Thus a deep, bold manoeuvre by ground 
forces, for example, requires co-ordinated action taken by mobile 
and fixed air units, and air defence units. 
In order to maintain an adequate operational tempo, units 
of all sizes should launch counter attacks as soon as possible. 
Even a smaller but well-led, fast- moving unit supported by long-
range weapon systems may cause significant casualties and 
damage to an adversary and his operations, but the 
preconditions for launching such an attack must be created by 
adequate support. Early and comprehensive situational 
awareness will enables unit commanders to take the initiative in 
such situations. 
Executing such operations requires flexibility, since 
established courses of action can be predicted. This flexibility 
pertains especially to the chain of command and organizational 
structures, and calls for interoperability among units, and 
especially C3I systems. 
The Finnish dilemma, in view of the requirement to be able 
to repel a wide-scale attack or a strategic strike, is that this 
requires versatility and flexibility on the part of all the units. The 
focus of their training and equipment should be on the tasks 
deemed to be required to repel a strategic strike. Defence against 
air landings is an example of such a task. 
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4.3 Improving force structure and organizations 
Force structure 
The training system of the Finnish conscript army will 
enable the maintenance of an efficient system based on regional 
defence in the future. Platoon and squad commanders and 
soldiers serving in the most demanding tasks serve for 12 months 
altogether, which is regarded as sufficient for the purposes of 
basic training and is then supplemented with regular refresher 
training. Soldiers doing their military service in more mundane 
duties can complete their basic training in six months. The 
frequency of regular refresher training courses for the reserves 
will increase as more funding is made available in the coming 
years, which will improve the overall performance of the Finnish 
mobilisation army.'14  
The Finnish Defence Forces have about 8 500 professional 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers, special officers 
and enlisted personnel who can be posted in a wartime 
organization, while the future field army will consist of some 430 
000 soldiers. This means that wartime units would include an 
average of approximately 2% professional soldiers. This figure 
is insufficient, however, for the manning requirements of the 
more technical units, which are expected to perform the most 
demanding tasks. 
Apart from the training system, the number of professional 
officers is one of the most important factors related to the 
performance of the units. This has been understood, and much 
attention has been focused on the deployment of personnel. No 
attempt is made at an equal division of professional soldiers, but 
rather their number has been allowed to vary between units. The 
best situation is naturally in the readiness brigades, which will 
also receive a higher number of enlisted soldiers in the coming 
years. This arrangement is expected to increase the performance 
of these units"-' 
The material problems are very much the same. The 
relatively small amount of money intended for acquisitions, 
when divided among all the services and units would mean that 
the future material requirements of the army brigades, for 
example, would be met at an extremely low rate. At the same 
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time, the equipment in use would continue to become 
obsolescent, and the overall cability to replace ageing material 
would continue to be exacerbated by increasing prices. To avoid 
this, Finnish units will be divided into categories based on the 
qualitative and quantitative differences in their equipment 
levels, the larger proportion of the new equipment being 
allocated to the best units. 
The situation illustrated above accentuates the need to 
create clearly separate troop categories. The tasks for the units 
should depend on their levels of training and equipment. This 
creates challenges and requirements for operational planning, 
but at the same time it will ensure the allocation of resources to 
the most sophisticated units. The concept of a rapid deployment 
brigade put forward in the government report (1997) will serve 
as the starting point for this development. 
Organization and tactics 
The battlefield of the future will call for increased flexibility 
and versatility on the part of all units. The basic structures of 
units should be separable and divisible, as the mission requires, 
and should be capable of being tailored quickly according to the 
tasks and situation concerned. Force sizes should also be planned 
according to mission requirements. This will provide field staffs 
with the ability to optimise forces and make quick alterations in 
structure to fit the changing battlefield situation. Flexible 
organizations also make it more difficult for the enemy to 
maintain an accurate picture of his adversary. 
Due to their unique organization and equipment, the 
Finnish armoured brigades will nowadays be mobilised as soon 
as general deployment starts. Once the armoured brigade is in 
action, the centre of gravity, or at least the direction of the action, 
will naturally be revealed, but its special requirements with 
respect to maintenance and C3 systems dictate that the armoured 
brigade must be deployed as a single entity. 
Drawbacks of this kind should be avoided when developing 
forms of organization. We should consider transferring from a 
fixed brigade structure to a structure in which the brigade-level 
headquarters would lead the battalions and supporting units, 
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which would be planned and tailored in the optimal manner. 
This would also support the flexibility requirement. 
The units planned for regional defence tasks should also be 
flexibly organised. The brigades planned to defend important 
areas are at present large, their mobility is poor and they are 
relatively easy to detect. Units in fixed, fortified positions are 
vulnerable, because fixed units can easily be bypassed or 
paralysed by massed fire.It would be worth studying whether at 
least some of the defence tasks could be carried out by smaller, 
mobile units supported by the systems required by their task. In 
addition to mobility, smaller units are also more difficult to 
detect as targets. 
This type of organizational flexibility requires significant 
training, since any headquarters should be capable of controlling 
combat battalions in mobile operations. C3I systems should be 
standardised, which is difficult to accomplish throughout the 
whole range of operational and regional units. 
The arrangement of logistics and heavy logistics units is 
currently a factor inhibiting mobile operations, but future 
sophisticated command, control and information systems will 
allow more "lightweight" logistics units due to the ability to 
optimise the distribution of material in time and space. It will no 
longer be necessary to equip units with large amounts of 
supplies, because commanders will be able to follow the logistics 
situation and allocate the material to the units as needed. Given 
real-time logistic situational awareness, it will be easier to use 
safe routes. The development of a pushing logistics system 
would improve the mobility of the combat troops and increase 
their operational tempo. 
The Finnish logistics system is dependent on that of the civil 
society, and the operational units do not have an independent 
logistics system which could operate for an extended period 
without civilian support. Overcoming this obstacle would open 
the way to improving freedom of action on the future battlefield. 
This applies primarily to the operational units, as it would in any 
case be easier to developing the logistics system of the regional 
units as their tasks are simpler and the areas in which they are 
expected to operate narrower. Also, their transportation 
requirements are less and many basic supplies can be stored in 
the area of operations in advance according to the anticipated 
requirements. Already developed civilian logistic systems could 
also be used to support local troops. 
The supplies and equipment procured should be as flexible 
and multipurpose as possible, and it will also be a requirement 
in the future that all equipment should be of high mobility and 
be protected against fire and electronic warfare. This means that 
the equipment should be functional in the context of various 
tasks and organizational structures. Such a requirement is crucial 
when considering intelligence and weapons systems for the 
services. Army UAVs, for example, should be able to provide 
targeting for Navy missile boats. In order to co-operate 
effectively, all the units in the different services should be able to 
co-operate and exchange information at the tactical level in real 
time, which means that all the C4I systems should be developed 
in a centralized manner and with close co-operation between the 
services. 
4.4 Leading the operations 
Since the future battlefield is predicted to be extremely 
mobile and dynamic, operational planning should be based on 
continuous transformation. Thus long-term operational planning 
may in the future be a waste of time. In US Army exercise 
experience, corps level headquarters are able to plan operations 
no more than 48 hours into the future116 , although this does 
not eliminate the requirement for extending the commander's 
operational intent well into the future. 
Flexibility, agility and ability to improvise will be the most 
important characteristics of commanders in the battlefield of the 
future. Situations will change rapidly and command and control 
systems may fail altogether. All operational commanders must 
have the capability to carry on their operations without guidance 
from superiors. This fact should be taken into consideration 
when choosing and training future commanders and staff 
personnel. 
Command and control 
The threats to command posts and C4I systems are clearly 
increasing, and in Finland's situation these threats will most 
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probably entail physical destruction rather than computer 
attacks on the software systems and programs used for C4I 
purposes. Operational-tactical C4I systems are in enclosed nets 
that are segregated from civilian systems, making any incursion 
difficult. 
As far as tactical-level command posts are concerned, 
mobility and protection against hostile fire and intelligence 
sensors should be improved. Command posts should be capable 
of moving more frequently without detriment to command and 
control activities. When organising operational-level command 
posts, mobility and protection should be the most important 
concerns. All command posts must be able to operate in an EW 
environment, as stationary command posts, even when located 
in well-protected shelters, will be vulnerable to the modern 
weapon systems of the future117 . 
The amount of information available to operational level 
command posts will increase significantly, and although 
management of the information flow will be facilitated by 
sophisticated information systems, additional personnel will 
obviously be needed. As the operational tempo increases, the 
requirement for enlarged command centre staff becomes 
obvious, due to the requirement for 24-hour operations. One 
should also bear in mind the need for managing ongoing 
operations at the same time as planning future ones. The 
complexity of modern warfare and modern technical systems 
will call for additional highly trained personnel in headquarters 
and command posts. In order to guarantee professionalism, the 
main personnel should be concentrated in the most important 
headquarters. 
Deep firing is increasing in importance and will become 
operationally critical in the future. Firing must be synchronic 
with the operational idea, and as the operational tempo 
increases, targeting must be centralised. Decisions related to 
targeting are best made at fire control posts organised in the 
units'118 , and prioritisation for the use and targeting of scarce 
long-range precision weapons is vital. In these situations detailed 
information on the enemy's organization, equipment and tactics 
is needed, much of it having been gathered in advance in 
peacetime and already used in training. 
The elimination of the clear boundary between peace and 
war creates new requirements for the operational level 
headquarters. The most important staff positions should be 
manned at least partially in peacetime as well, and C4I systems 
should be equipped with simulators to enable efficient training 
and war games. As training requirements for personnel posted 
in operational unit headquarters will become more exacting in 
the future, commanders and other leaders should be chosen very 
carefully. They should be given the opportunity to become 
familiar with their duties and tasks, as should other personnel in 
the operational headquarters. Frequent shifting of tasks should 
be avoided, which would also make it easier to fill staff positions 
in international headquarters for crisis management operations. 
In order to increase operational tempo, chains of command 
should be as short as possible. The time for dealing with orders 
and reports should be minimised, and modern C4I systems 
should be used to transfer situation data to the battalion level. 
Operational units should have a self-sufficient communications 
system enabling the command and control of mobile operations 
without the requirement of support from the regional 
communications networks. The communication system should 
additionally enable connections to be made with Air Force and 
Navy units. The communication arrangements of the regional 
units could be based on fixed networks operated primarily by 
the civil authorities. 
Optimisation of the forces available calls for centralisation 
of the capabilities of all the services present in the area of 
operations. Joint operations procedures should be developed in 
order to maximise synergy. 
The operational planning and tasking process 
One of the most important factors in the future battlefield 
will be tempo, as it is this that will enable one's own forces to 
maintain the initiative over the adversary119 . To maintain the 
operational tempo, commanders must have a smoothly 
functioning command and control system. The major goal is to 
achieve a decision-making cycle that is faster than the 
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adversary's corresponding cycle., which can be done by 
expediting the operational planning and tasking process and 
simplifying the command and control system. The main focus in 
training should be on increasing the expertise of the commanders 
and staff. 
The emphasis in the planning process should be on 
preparing plans and optional courses of action for presentation 
to the commander as the situation requires120. US Army 
information warfare trials have demonstrated that operational 
plans have become too long and detailed during the 
"information age", and consequently detailed operational plans 
and orders should be valid for a very limited period of time 
compared with broad, overall plans. Instead of developing long, 
detailed plans, we must be able to evaluate the enemy's courses 
of action quickly in order to compare them with our own fairly 
broad overall plans and options. Staffs and operational 
subordinates must not be exhausted by excessively complicated 
orders and instructions. 
In accordance with this experience, future leaders should be 
capable of evaluating and anticipating the enemy's course of 
action and improvising accordingly. The most important steps 
are to achieve adequate situational awareness and to make rapid 
decisions. On the other hand, one must bear in mind that 
situational awareness is never complete. It is always necessary 
to rely on less than perfect assessments. 
Time is a crucial element on the modern battlefield. 
Shortening the operational planning and tasking process can 
gain this time. Theoretically, time can be saved if each command 
level is able to process information more quickly. In addition, 
minimising the number of command levels involved in the 
operational planning and tasking process can gain time. The idea 
is described in a figure below. The main problem seems to be the 
sequential nature of the process. 
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Consecutive process 
Assessment and 	Tas 
planning 
Assessment and 
planning 
Parallell process 	 Assessment and planning 
Assessment and 
planning 
Assessment and 
planning 
Assessment and 
planning 
Figure 10. 	Schematic comparison between consecutive and parallel 
planning and tasking processes. 
A strengthening of the existing procedure of issuing 
separate orders could accelerate the operational planning and 
tasking process. Subordinate commanders should be engaged in 
the early stages of the operational planning process, if possible 
121 , and subordinate units could in this case begin with their 
own detailed planning, including contingency plans thus adding 
their input to the planning process for forthcoming actions, 
which would increase their commitment and understanding of 
the mission in hand. 
This parallel operational planning and tasking process 
demands a redistribution of situational awareness. The 
functional contradiction between the chain of command and the 
distribution of information is described in the following 
diagram, representing an integrated command and control 
system. As with development of the operational planning and 
tasking process, the hierarchy should be rationalised in order to 
enable the sharing of situational information without delay. 
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Figure 11. 	Chain of command and information flow in an integrated 
command and control structure. 
The purpose of the operational planning and tasking 
process is to create the best possible situation for execution of 
the orders by the force. In order to create sophisticated 
operational concepts and plans, the commander and the staff 
require a significant amount of information, and any operational 
concept will be a worthless piece of paper or data if the operation 
is not executed on time. 
As described in the diagram below, the available 
information increases as time to act on that information 
decreases. A command and control plan must define "decision-
making windows" for the correct timing of decisions. The size of 
each window will depend on the mission, the performance 
capacity of friendly forces and the level of command and control. 
The time requirement can be minimised if the commander is 
willing to take risks. 
-Tme — Awareness 
Figure 12. 	The "decision-making window" 
In order to gain the required time for the commanders and 
staff, friendly forces should be able to launch the operations 
rapidly and the operations themselves should be accelerated. 
Standardised procedures offer one way to gain time, at least at 
the tactical level, and battle techniques should be standardised, 
too. If the commander can be sure of launching the activities in 
accordance with prepared and trained procedures, he will have 
more time for planning the next phases of his operation. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Information warfare is not an independent entity, but is 
closely related to traditional warfare while stressing new areas 
of technology. The methods of information warfare may be 
exploited as a part of operations. Only the United States will have 
a limited capacity to execute information operations on the 
tactical - operational level in the near future, while the western 
countries, although trying to follow developments in the United 
States, will find that the capabilities of even their best units will 
remain below the US level. 
Russia's capability for conducting information operations is 
limited, and progress will be slow. Russian military power is 
based mainly on traditional, heavy, mobilised forces, and their 
ability to launch a traditional conventional wide attack will 
decrease over the next decade, at the same time as their ability to 
launch surprise attacks or raids with professional units 
remaining on the alert in peacetime will increase. Such surprise 
attacks or raids will make use of the methods of information 
warfare. Psychological warfare will play a major role in 
supporting operations, especially at the initial phases. 
The recent events in Chechnya prove that Russia is not yet 
able to conduct warfare on the terms of the information era, and 
development in that direction will take its time. Nevertheless, 
the set-up in the war in Chechnya in 1999 - 2000 was not the 
accustomed one, due to the inequality and differences between 
the parties. Russia has been compelled to destroy the 
infrastructure there as well as the guerrilla positions. Chechnya 
is a good example of asymmetric warfare, which would merit 
separate study. 
The developers of the Finnish defence doctrine must have 
been considering two main threats. First, a substantial 
mobilisation army must be maintained in order to repel a 
"traditional" wide-scale attack on Finnish territory, while on the 
other hand, forces must be developed to operate in the 
information era battlefield, to repel limited information 
operations associated with surprise strategic raids. The 
characteristics of the future battlefield will complicate 
development. When looking at these requirements, the country's 
unique opportunities should not be forgotten. Finland has the 
advantage of being one of the advanced information societies of 
the world. 
Given limited resources, an entire mobilisation army cannot 
be equipped to conduct all the missions mentioned. Existing 
equipment must be utilised, since it is sufficient for equipping 
the main forces, and consequently the focus of development 
must be on a few units, to create a capability for responding to 
modern threats. The basis for this is set out in the government's 
report of 17th March 1997, which states that the centre of gravity 
related to development will be fixed on the three readiness 
brigades, supporting systems and the most important units of 
the Air Force and Navy. 
This decision inevitably divides the defence forces into 
"ordinary units" (regional units) and " units of excellence" 
(operational units) in a manner similar to that used by Sun Tzu 
to divide his units long ago. The "ordinary units" will remain 
less well equipped, while the "units of excellence" will be 
equipped equally, or to some extent even better, than the foreign 
units situated in the vicinity of Finland. This division will 
correspond to the needs. The "units of excellence" will be 
responsible for repelling a strategic surprise attack and for 
international missions, whereas the "ordinary units" will play 
an important role in raising the enemy's threshold for launching 
an operation. In a wide-scale attack scenario the "units of 
excellence " will provide a means of operating against the 
enemy's crucial systems and activities. 
This will increases the demands on the operational-level 
leaders in particular, who must be able to lead units with 
different capabilities and to prepare for different and more 
complex threats, especially during the grey phase between peace 
time and war. In contrast to the requirements of the past, leaders 
must be able to exploit the capabilities of new, sophisticated 
weapons systems and co-ordinate the actions of the different 
services and branches in fast-moving situations over a very deep 
area. 
On the other hand, one should not neglect the task of 
improving the "ordinary units". Their equipment, and especially 
their organization and tactics, should be developed in order to 
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enable them to operate on the battlefield of the information era. 
Their main task should be one of providing support for the 
"units of excellence ". The crucial factors will be the activity and 
initiative of the tactical-level leaders and good use of "mission 
tactics". The most important element in the development process 
is likely to be evolution in the manner of thinking and training 
related to new operational concepts. 
Strictly defined wartime organizations should be 
modified to be more flexible in order to be able to adjust their 
compositions in accordance with their tasks and the case-
by-case requirements placed on them. Wartime readiness 
should be improved by concentrating on the training of 
commanders and operational personnel. To simplify and 
accelerate the operational leadership process, we should 
consider the possibilities for reducing the number of 
organizational levels. Certain units should be capable of 
participating in international peacekeeping operations and 
conducting information operations in a multinational 
environment. Decisions made concerning the development of 
warfare equipment will enable a broadening of Finnish 
operational thinking. The results will ultimately be 
implemented in plans and field manuals after a considerable 
interval. 
In the light of the changes in modern warfare, development 
of Finland's material readiness and opportunities for enhancing 
operational art should be studied and analysed critically, but 
with an open mind. The goals for this development may 
realistically be achieved by the years 2010 - 2020. 
Despite technological development, the traditional 
casualties and human suffering of warfare will remain 
unchanged; although the boundaries between the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of warfare will grow less distinct. 
Warfare will still be a matter of exercising a strong will. A nation 
willing to preserve its independence and able to maintain a high 
level of willingness to defend its territory by force will be a 
difficult adversary even for a major power. Unique Finnish 
tactics, backed by the regional defence structure, will remain a 
feasible solution for this country. 
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